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Abstract: 
 
This paper investigates the mechanisms through which a cluster policy can enhance 
entrepreneurship defined as new venture creations. It is based on the sudy of a cluster policy 
(“BioRegio”) that strongly stimulated new firm creations in biotechnology in Germany after 
1996. The process induced by BioRegio at the territory-level is analyzed over a 10 year period 
(1995-2004). The article identifies a three-step social mechanism through which a cluster 
policy can enhance entrepreneurship. The presented results strengthen the literature on cluster 
policies and clusters on the specific issue of entrepreneurship: four main contributions are 
suggested. 
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1 Introduction 
Many Western governments have recently implemented public policies directly targeted at 
developing clusters, defined as “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field” (Porter, 1998, p.78). In high-technology sectors, such “cluster 
policies” generally aim at increasing the concentration of firms and interorganizational 
networks between small and medium enterprises, large firms, research centres/universities 
and public authorities in a given technological area and territory1 (Borràs and Tsagdis, 2008; 
Burfitt et al., 2007; Duranton et al., 2009). In Finland for example, cluster-based policies have 
even become the general form of national innovation policy (Author’s name, in this special 
issue), while in Germany, the BioRegio program was one of the first cluster-based national 
technology policies implemented by European states to enhance innovation and economic 
competitiveness (Dohse, 2007). 
In high-tech sectors, the dynamic of clusters mostly relies on new venture creations that 
commercially exploit the latest scientific and technological discoveries (Casper, 2007; Powell 
et al., 2011; Saxenian, 1994). The literature dedicated to high-tech clusters and 
entrepreneurship in Western contexts has identified several factors enabling entrepreneurship, 
such as the type of networks developed by entrepreneurs (Grossetti and Barthe, 2008; Maurer 
and Ebers, 2006; Powell et al., 2011), the “localized knowledge spillovers” between research 
institutes and new ventures (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Feldman, 2003; Zucker et al., 
1998), or the availability of specific local collective competition goods, called “start-up 
goods”, (e.g. technology transfer services, “seedcorn” and follow-on equity) (Proudfoot, 
2004). Yet, in all of these contributions, cluster policies were not considered as one of the 
factors possibly fostering entrepreneurship, although Feldman et al. (2005) invite 
                                                 
1For the OECD, cluster policies comprise “ the set of policy activities that aim to stimulate and support the 
emergence of these networks, strengthen the inter-linkages between the different part of the networks; and 
increase the value added of their actions” (OECD, 1999). 
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consideration of public policies as shaping the economic success of entrepreneurs building 
firms in clusters.  
 
The objective of this article is to address the important question of “how or through which 
mechanisms can a cluster policy enhance entrepreneurship?”. Entrepreneurship is defined as 
the creation of new ventures (Ireland et al., 2005). In a Schumpeterian perspective, 
entrepreneurs are viewed as innovators combining in idiosyncratic ways heterogeneous 
production factors (e.g. capital, workforce, technological knowledge) and, by so doing, 
creating a new product, a new production method, a new market or a new supply chain 
(Schumpeter, 1934).  
This research question has hitherto been largely overlooked, as most existing contributions 
have focused not on the creation of new ventures per se but on the more general regional 
innovation dynamics (including, for example, inter-firm and firm-university cooperations, in 
addition to venture creations). Consequently, there is no theoretical contribution that offers a 
feasible answer to this issue and the best research strategy to address it is inductive theory 
building from case study (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The case 
chosen is BioRegio, a cluster policy that strongly stimulated biotechnology entrepreneurship 
in Germany. The process induced by this policy is analyzed over a 10 year period (1995-
2004) in two regions. 
 
The structure is as follows. In the first section, I present the theoretical background. Then, the 
research methodology and the empirical data are described, before an overview of the 
BioRegio program is given. The following section summarizes the empirical results, 
accounting for the processes initiated by BioRegio in both regions studied. In the final section, 
a theoretical proposition on how a cluster policy can enhance entrepreneurship is outlined. It 
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is also argued that the results extend existing approaches to cluster policies on the specific 
issue of entrepreneurship. 
 
2 Theoretical background 
Two main approaches have been used to analyze cluster policies. They addressed the issue of 
their effect on new venture creations only obliquely.  
First, the “regional innovation systems” approach (Braczyk et al., 1998; Cooke et al., 1997) 
has focused on the innovation capacity of regions in general – with new venture creations 
being only one part of this. It has previously been identified that a culture among regional 
actors of cooperation and trust was a condition for increasing the likelihood of having a strong 
potential for regional innovation systems, that is, systems of collective order characterized by 
regular interactions between regional actors and linkages between region-based organizations 
(Cooke, 1998, 2001; Cooke et al., 1997). In this perspective, regional institutions are 
considered a key factor explaining the regions’ success or failure in innovation (Doloreux and 
Bitard, 2005). 
Consistent with the regional innovation systems approach, relatively few contributions have 
identified that a BioRegio-type cluster policy could significantly enhance communication and 
cooperation among regional key actors (Dohse, 2000b) and moreover “generate relatively 
strong mobilization effects for innovative activity by stimulating the division of innovative 
labor” as well as “induce actors to establish new contacts, deepen existing relationships and 
create new innovation networks that have not existed yet” (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005, p. 
1276). However, little is known about the causality link – which is hypothesized in these 
contributions – between these new cooperative interactions at the territory-level and the 
observable increase in venture creations. In addition, the concept of “regional institutions” 
often has limited explanatory power regarding the general innovation dynamics taking place 
 5 
within territories and, specifically, high-tech firm creations, as it may designate very different 
empirical realities (either formal institutions or informal ones, regional organizations, the 
region itself or, sometimes, a process of “institutional learning”) (Doloreux and Bitard, 2005). 
The second approach used to study cluster policies comes from institutionalism, especially 
following the “varieties of capitalism” tradition (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This body of 
research has viewed national cluster policies as aiming at overcoming obstacles to innovation 
that result from the institutional framework of a given nation. In Germany, cluster policies 
like BioRegio seek to overcome hurdles such as the bank-based financial system, the 
regulative nature of German institutions, which, combined with non-market patterns of 
coordination, create constraints against firms developing radically innovative products 
(Casper, 2000; Sternberg et al., 2010). BioRegio was aimed at overcoming specific 
institutional barriers: the low interest of pharmaceutical/chemical companies, weak impulses 
from academic research to found new firms, limited government support, and an institutional 
context not aligned with the needs of biotechnology (e.g. no venture-capital market) (Krauss 
and Stahlecker, 2001). In this perspective, BioRegio enabled the appearance of radically 
innovative ventures that are traditionally not stimulated by the German national innovation 
system, because it induced an adaptation of the institutional framework in which firms are 
embedded, by creating sector-specific institutions supporting entrepreneurs (such as 
biotechnology promotion offices, technology parks and incubators) (Casper, 2000) and 
because it improved the venture-capital offer for biotechnology firms within territories 
(Krauss and Stahlecker, 2001). Compared to the US, German cluster-based technology 
policies present one specificity: on top of regional states and municipalities, the Federal 
government intervenes in them, using them as “top-down stimuli to mobilize regional efforts” 
(Sternberg et al., 2010, p. 1077). Nonetheless, a few questions remain: how does this 
mobilization take place and who are the key regional actors involved? What is the role played 
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by the Federal state? The formal existence of specific institutions does not suffice to 
understand the development of entrepreneurship: the action of these institutions as well as 
their utility for entrepreneurs should be empirically investigated. 
In order to understand how a cluster policy can enhance entrepreneurship, the complex and 
dynamic social process of emergence and stabilization of regional interactions and new 
institutions supporting entrepreneurs should all be studied, as well as the use of these sector-
specific support institutions by entrepreneurs. 
 
3 Methodology and empirical data 
In order to address the issues raised, the adopted research strategy is inductive theory building 
from case study – rather than theory testing – that is “a research strategy that involves using 
one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from 
case-based empirical evidence (…), [t]he central notion [being] to use cases as the basis from 
which to develop theory inductively” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 25). 
The research design is a longitudinal “collective case study” (Langley and Royer, 2006) or an 
“embedded case study” (Yin, 1994), that is, a single case study of a national cluster policy’s 
implementation including two sub-units of analysis: regions and firms. Two regions applying 
to BioRegio were studied (the Rhine-Neckar Triangle around Heidelberg and Berlin-
Brandenburg) as well as 41 biotechnology firms, 22 of which could be analyzed more 
intensively in a longitudinal fashion. The sub-unit sample was built following two 
methodological principles: replication logic and contrasting cases. The replication logic is 
central to building theory from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989): like a series of related 
laboratory experiments, multiple sub-unit cases are discrete experiments that serve as 
replications to the emerging theoretical propositions (Yin, 1994). Therefore, the theoretical 
propositions that are offered on how a cluster policy can enhance entrepreneurship rely on the 
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fact that similar BioRegio implementation processes were observed in the two regions studied, 
and that similarities in the use of local support actors among heterogeneous biotech firms 
were identified. For replication purposes, the most appropriate research strategy is to sample 
constrasted cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). This explains why two regions were selected in that they 
were entrepreneurially rich and did apply to BioRegio, albeit with contrasting outcomes (the 
Rhine-Neckar Triangle being chosen as a model region by the Federal Ministry of Research, 
unlike Berlin-Brandenburg). Both regions belong to the largest and most successful German 
life sciences clusters (Development Bank of Japan, 2006)2. Criteria for choosing the Rhine-
Neckar-Triangle as a winning region case were: (i) privileged access to the research field 
(Yin, 1994), because of personal contacts and geographic proximity, (ii) the fact that, at the 
time of the fieldwork, the Munich case had been more documented in the academic and 
practitioner’s literature than the Rhine-Neckar Triangle, (iii) the existence of an ambitious 
state policy fostering biotechnology in Bavaria prior to BioRegio, which could have made it 
difficulty to differentiate the mechanisms enhancing entrepreneurship that were due to 
BioRegio from those due to this older state policy. The main sampling criteria for firms was to 
maximize the heterogeneity of the cases (e.g. different technologies and markets, types of 
funding, profiles of founders). Firms that did not receive BioRegio funding in the Rhine-
Neckar Triangle were included in the sample. 
Data were collected between January 2002 and September 2004. Semi-directed interviews 
were conducted with 157 representatives from the German biotechnology industry (see 
appendix). Numerous and highly knowledgeable informants were used who offer different 
views on the effect of BioRegio. This can help limit biases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
                                                 
2
 The Rhine-NeckarTriangle gathers several internationally recognized research centres in life sciences as well as 
major pharmaceutical/chemical companies (e.g. Merck, Roche Diagnostics, Sanofi-Synthelabo, BASF/Abbott). 
In 2005, 46 biotech firms with 1410 employees were registered. Berlin-Brandenburg has 28 universities and 
higher education institutions and enjoys the highest density in Germany in terms of research capacities. Schering 
is the only large pharmaceutical company located in the region. In 2005, 156 biotech ventures and 3 200 
employees were in Berlin-Brandenburg. (Sources: author’s data; Development Bank of Japan, 2006). 
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To avoid the possibility of memory recall bias, interview data were supplemented with 
archival data – including, for example, written application forms to BioRegio given to the 
Federal Ministry of Research in 1996 by local actors and confidential activity reports by 
BioRegio-derived support institutions.  
The results and subsequent propositions generated in this article result from a rigorous data 
analysis process. Interview and written data were systematically analyzed and compared 
along major emerging themes (for example, the collective mobilization initated by BioRegio). 
Statements drawn from this comparison were summarized in two detailed intermediary case-
study write-ups for each region of about 100 pages each. As advocated by Yin (1994), when 
the analytic strategy is explanation building from a case study, the data analysis process was 
iterative: the statements made in each regional write-up were compared against each other, 
often leading to revised statements. Statements or propositions were only made when several 
different data sources supported them. The ensuing research propositions are not universal, 
but historically situated mid-range theories3. 
 
4 Presentation of the BioRegio contest 
Launched in 1995 by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), BioRegio 
aimed at strengthening the German biotechnology industry - biotechnology being seen as a 
key technology and a driver of economic growth - and at catching up with the US and the UK 
in this sector. The program’s objectives were to develop life science clusters, increase start-up 
creations, support the growth of existing firms, foster venture capital, and improve acceptance 
of biotechnology among the broader population. Playing a prototype role in Germany, this 
                                                 
3
 The fact that Berlin-Brandenburg has very rich scientific capacities in life sciences limits the generalization 
possibility of the results observed in this region to other ‘losing’ regions. It is likely that in less scientifically 
dense regions that were not selected by BioRegio the contest process did not provoke the emergence of so many 
innovative firms as it did in Berlin-Brandenburg. 
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cluster policy was replicated by BMBF in policies supporting biotechnology4, in programs 
fostering other technological fields, such as multimedia or nanotechnology, as well as in 
policies promoting technological development elsewhere in Germany (Dohse, 2000a, 2007; 
Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). 
BioRegio is a cluster policy that strongly stimulated the creation of new ventures in the 
second half of the 1990’s (see figure 1), pushing the German biotechnology industry to the 
top position in Europe by 2000.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The main actors involved in the field consider the BioRegio program as the founding event of 
this industry5. The evaluation of BioRegio commissioned in 2005 by the BMBF also 
concluded that BioRegio “significantly contributed to the creation/boom of a German biotech 
industry in the mid- and end 1990’s and to the emergence of a commercial biotech sector in 
Germany” (Staehler et al., 2007, p.4). The involvement in BioRegio enabled Berlin-
Brandenburg, the Rhine-Neckar Triangle and Munich to become the leading biotechnology 
clusters in Germany (Development Bank of Japan, 2006). Interestingly, comparable 
entrepreneurship dynamics occurred in the ‘winning’ regions, or those territories selected by 
the Federal ministry as which occurred in the ‘losing’ ones during the public program (1997-
2001)6. 
Specifially, the ministry asked regions to organize themselves in order to promote innovation 
(Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005) and to propose a local project by the end of 1996, which was 
                                                 
4
 e.g. BioChance launched in 1998, BioFuture in 1998, BioProfile in 1999, BioChance Plus in 2004, ExistGo-
Bio in 2005. 
5
 Mainly focused on health care applications (“red biotechnologies”), the German biotechnology industry 
produces a pipeline of new pharmaceutical compounds: in 2007, 316 products were being developed by these 
companies (Ernst & Young, 2008).  
6
 BioRegio’s evaluation report notes that firm creations were more numerous in winning regions than in the 
remaining regions (Staehler et al., 2007, p.28). Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that firm creations took 
place in all the 17 bioregions. This constitutes a counter-intuitive fact that will be explained later in the paper.  
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supposed to meet the above mentioned general objectives of the ministry. Here “regions” 
were not to be interpreted in an administrative sense: the regional actors could freely define 
the geographical boundaries of their territories, which did not have to be consistent with the 
German administrative structures of regional states [Länder], circles [Kreise] and 
municipalities [Kommunen]. More precisely, the Federal ministry (BMBF) asked regional 
actors to (i) make an inventory of their capacities and competencies in biotechnology (size, 
number, profile, production of region-based research institutions, university hospitals and 
biotechnology firms; existing interactions between these organizations) and (ii) to propose a 
concept of “integration of capabilities and activities in biotechnology” at the regional level 
(Source: BioRegio call for projects). Thus, actors were asked to conceive a strategy and 
suggest tools to transform the regions’ academic knowledge base into commercial products 
through firm creations, and knowledge transfer between science and industry. Regarding firm 
founding, local actors were asked to propose housing solutions for start-ups including 
incubators and technology parks, as well as funding schemes. Another explicit demand from 
the Federal state was that local actors should combine in their project already existing federal, 
regional and municipal public programs supporting biotechnology and new ventures.  
Seventeen regions submitted “local concepts” and applied for BioRegio’s funds in autumn 
1996. In November 1996, three winners were announced by the ministry: Heidelberg7, 
Cologne, and Munich8. Over a five year period (1996-2001), each of these “model regions” 
gained access to a 25 million euros budget for collaborative R&D projects carried out by 
small and medium-sized enterprises in their region. Jena, in the eastern part of Germany, 
received a special prize of 15 million euros. 
                                                 
7
 I will use Heidelberg and Rhine-Neckar Triangle in an undifferentiated way in the article. 
8
 Criteria for selection reflected BMBF’s demands to the regions. The ministry based its judgment mainly on the 
following elements: existing biotechnology companies in the region, number and profile of biotechnology 
research institutes, interdisciplinary research collaborations, supply of support services like patent offices or 
advice services, local strategy of new product- or service development based on scientific knowledge, systems to 
promote the coming or creation of biotechnology firms in the region, and funding possibilities for life sciences 
companies. These criteria were known by all applicants. 
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5 Empirical results  
This section presents key findings (partly summarized in table 5) describing the process 
initiated by BioRegio in two regions. It shows: (i) how regional contexts and institutions 
matter, as the dynamics taking place and the solutions conceived are region-specific; (ii) that 
similar trends can be identified in different regional settings; and (iii) that time plays a 
significant role in the dynamics and success or failure of this program. Three mechanisms 
through which the cluster policy studied enhanced entrepreneurship are successively 
presented (4.1 to 4.3), before pointing to their fragility (4.4). 
 
5.1 Genesis of a local collective action to support entrepreneurs (1995-1996)  
The launch of BioRegio gave impetus to a new territory-based collective action aimed at 
sustaining entrepreneurship, mostly enabled by convergent interests among regional actors. 
Once BioRegio was announced by the BMBF in October 1995, heterogeneous local actors 
mobilized around the application process and conceived localized projects, which were 
subsequently submitted to the BMBF in autumn 1996. The decision to participate in the 
public contest was made in contingent ways in both of the regions studied, that is, at different 
times, on the initiative of different actors, and motivated by singular reasons (see table 1). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
However, this decision generated in both Berlin and Heidelberg a generalized participation of 
various public and private actors. The initiators in both regions succeeded in convincing a 
range of local actors – mainly from research institutions, pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms, public local authorities (state ministries, technology parks supported by municipal and 
regional governments, chambers of commerce and industry), and finance institutions – to 
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participate. Consequently, organized collective actions took place gathering these 
aforementioned actors with the goal of conceiving an application to BioRegio. Workgroups 
were created to prepare a specific part of the application file to be submitted to the BMBF9. 
The groups designed a local project consisting of existing as well as newly created 
organizations and tools. These were aimed at fostering technology transfer in biosciences, 
especially promoting firm creation activities. In Berlin-Brandenburg, they created BioTop, a 
“central coordination cell for all requests in biotechnology”, which served as a “one-stop 
agency whose core mission [was] to create connections between the various activities taking 
place in the region in biotechnology”10. Technology parks also built up new systems to help 
firm founders, like “Biostart”, a sensibilization and teaching program aimed at making 
scientists aware of start-up creations and at teaching them basic business administration skills. 
In the Rhine-Neckar Triangle, local actors conceived a four-fold structure: a not-for-profit 
organization (called “BioRegio association”) helping scientists wanting to create a company 
in the incubation phase of their project, which would then select and manage the access to the 
BMBF BioRegio grants; a seed financing fund for very early-stage companies; a company 
(later renamed “Heildelberg Innovation”) which both managed the investment fund and 
assisted entrepreneurs in their firm creation activities; and a life sciences park hosting new 
ventures.  
Every local actor had both singular and specific reasons for wanting to take part in BioRegio 
(see table 2), but these reasons converged in the same general direction.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
9
 For example, in Heidelberg, work was divided between four groups dedicated, respectively, to research, 
funding, preparation of the BioRegio file, and communication with the public. 
10
 Quoted from Berlin-Brandenburg BioRegio application file, p. 76. 
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Three characteristics of the BioRegio program facilitated the congruence of motivations. First, 
BioRegio was specific to a technological field that was surrounded in the second half of the 
1990’s with positive expectations shared among policy makers. Biotechnologies were 
identified as key technologies for future medical, agricultural, food and industry innovations 
and for national economic competitiveness (e.g. BMBF, 1996a, 1996b). These taken-for-
granted assumptions of the benefits of biotechnologies created a cognitive framework shared 
by federal, regional and municipal policy makers as well as various institutional actors (e.g. 
chambers of commerce, saving banks). Concomitantly, they facilitated the convergence of 
interests of these actors towards participating in BioRegio.  
Second, the objectives formulated by the ministry were in harmony with other research and 
innovation or local development policies that were being implemented at the same time. For 
example, universities were increasingly obliged by federal and regional governments to 
generate external revenues, as well as to conduct not only basic but also applied research. 
This meant they needed to be concerned with the economic use of the scientific knowledge 
produced. As part of territorial development policies since the 1980’s, regional and municipal 
governments had also started to build “technology parks”, which offered well-equipped 
laboratory and office spaces to entrepreneurs. While Heidelberg’s technology park appeared 
in 1985, decisions to build several science parks dedicated to biotechnology were made in 
Berlin and Brandenburg in the first half of the 1990’s as part of a regional policy following 
the German reunification. Another major innovation policy implemented in 1994 was a very 
strong incentive program promoting venture-capital called “BTU” (“Equity investment for 
young technology ventures”) by the Federal Ministry of Economy. This program provided co-
financing (“silent partnership”) for young high-tech firms by a federal public financial 
institution called “Tbg” (Technology Investment Company). Here, the state, through the Tbg, 
offered one additional euro to any equity investor investing one euro in an innovative firm, up 
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to a limit of 1,5 million Euros. In addition, a public bank called “KfW” (Credit institution For 
Reconstruction) offered to refinance 75% of the funds invested by an equity investor in a high 
tech venture: out of 10 euros invested in a start-up, a venture-capital firm received 7,5 Euros 
from the KfW. On top of these financial subsidies, both tools partly covered the bankruptcy 
risk borne by investors in firms benefiting from one of these programs. 
The third characteristic of the BioRegio program that facilitated significant alignment of 
motivations was the large amount of freedom left to local actors to conceive their project: the 
geographical boundaries of their territory could be freely defined, as well as the various tools 
to be utilized.  
 
5.2 Formalization of the initial cooperation by organizational creation/stabilization 
(1996-2001) 
The second mechanism generated by BioRegio was a formalization of the initial cooperation 
through the creation, then ensuing stabilization of new organizational structures and tools to 
sustain biotechnology entrepreneurs. 
 
5.2.1.Genesis of local support organizations and tools (Nov. 1996-1997) 
In the months following the BioRegio’s results (announced in November 1996), inter-
connected new organizations and tools intended to sustain biotechnology entrepreneurs at the 
territory level were developed in ‘losing’ regions as well as in ‘winning’ ones. During the 
application phase, as previously described, such tools and organizations had been conceived. 
Some of these were even implemented before the results of the contest were known, such as 
BioTop in Berlin. Others were implemented afterwards not only in Heidelberg, in conformity 
with what had been planned, but also – and surprisingly – in Berlin-Brandenburg (e.g. 
“Biostart”). The undifferentiated implementation of plans conceived within the contest phase 
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can be explained by the emergence of opportunities regarding the fostering of entrepreneurial 
projects, which territorial actors decided to exploit in the following years.  
The conception phase of a local project for BioRegio was characterized by repeated 
interactions between representatives from local research institutes, universities, support 
actors, Länder, cities, and financial institutions, which resulted in an increased degree of 
inter-knowledge among local actors. 
“The BioRegio contest led people who didn’t know each other and did not talk 
together to get to know what the others were doing. Even the various university 
research institutes did not talk to each other before BioRegio!” (BioRegio association, 
Heidelberg) 
 
These increased interactions enabled the emergence of a collective territory-based action of 
identifying local problems and conceiving adhoc solutions in the form of tools and 
organizations, which both reflected and responded to constraints specific to their territories. 
For example, in the ‘losing’ region case (Berlin-Brandenburg), the team in charge of 
conceiving a project proposal for BioRegio had to address the following “problem”: numerous 
R&D projects were proposed by scientists because of the high number of research institutions 
engaged in biotechnology within the region, but these projects were too often regarded as 
“academic”. To resolve this, the local team structured the research activities by defining 
thematic axes in which R&D projects could be integrated. They also searched for potential 
industry partners for purely academic projects. Finally, they also tried to convince local 
politicians and other representatives from both Länder, as well as local financial institutions, 
to set up a seed fund as in the Heidelberg case11. Consequently, at the time the BioRegio 
results were announced, various opportunities had already emerged, which local actors like 
BioTop sought to exploit. For instance, contacts had been established with local financial 
institutions which resulted in the establishment of a network of financial institutions interested 
                                                 
11
 However, the various attempts failed because of financial difficulties experienced by the Länder and internal 
conflicts between representatives from both political and administrative sections. 
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in investing in biotechnology start-ups (“Biofinanz”). Thematic R&D networks connecting 
academic and industrial partners were also created and managed by BioTop, increasing the 
likelihood of receiving funding from BMBF and the Länder.  
Having explored the launch of BioRegio, we now turn to consider the additional dynamics 
that occurred in the years following the contest results. 
 
5.2.2 Stabilization of BioRegio-derived organizations (1998-2001) 
Many organizations created within the BioRegio process became enduring and viable entities. 
In the winning regions, funding was received from the Federal ministry as well as from 
industry and banks as planned in the application. In the ‘losing’ regions, they also managed to 
convince other institutions that they should exploit the opportunities that had emerged during 
the application phase. Therefore, they still obtained funding which guaranteed their survival. 
For example, at the end of 1997, the Berlin-based agency BioTop received funding for staff 
and equipment over a few years, from both Länder Berlin and Brandenburg and from the 
German Union for Chemical Industry. 
 
5.2.3 An intermediation role of local support organizations (1998- 2001)  
The third mechanism initiated by the cluster policy was that the new BioRegio-derived 
organizations began cooperating with an increasing number of other local organizations 
sustaining entrepreneurship. In turn, they were able to play an intermediation role between the 
entrepreneurs and relevant resource providers. 
The context by the end of the 1990’s was an emergence of new tools and organizations 
supporting entrepreneurs and these were implemented mainly by regional ministries and cities 
(see table 3). 
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------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Thus, the BioRegio-derived organizations cooperated with these newly created local support 
organizations because of an inter-knowledge process and a labor division among these 
complementary organizations. More precisely, these support organizations played an 
intermediation role between firm founders and their partners.  
By playing a counseling role, they first provided entrepreneurs with valuable information that 
was important to implementing their project (e.g. how to proceed for incorporation, how to 
file a patent, what type of funding exists, and what documents to produce for financing 
partners). 
“My job is to support entrepreneurs. Concretely, this means that when someone comes 
and tells me that he wants to create a company, he gets from me everything he needs to 
know. I tell him how to write a business plan, I give him a template, for example the 
Deutsche Bank CD-Rom or the business plan contest’s guide. I explain to him also that 
he needs to see a lawyer to incorporate his company and that the lawyer will give him 
advice on the legal structure to choose (GmbH or AG).” (technology park Berlin) 
 
More importantly, they also acted as contact-makers by putting (would-be) entrepreneurs into 
contact with the various partners that would bring resources required to implement their 
project: (i) scientific partners (mainly from local academic research institutes, in order to 
obtain public grants for R&D network projects), (ii) other supporting actors (technology 
parks, technology transfer offices, BioRegio local organizations), and, above all, (iii) financial 
actors for funding. The last arrangement differed slightly according to the region (see table 4).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Finally, local public support actors encouraged certain types of behaviors, thereby playing a 
third role of norm diffusion. For example, as they put start-up founders in contact with 
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venture-capital investors they presented the latter as natural and desirable partners for 
entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, fieldwork on entrepreneurs’ modalities of building up companies also shows that 
firm founders and Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) quite frequently mobilized these local 
support organizations and tools to obtain needed resources, especially funding. In seven of the 
12 in-depth longitudinal analyses of firms created between 1996 and 2000 carried out by the 
author, entrepreneurs mobilized (in addition to their interpersonal networks) external 
organizations, meeting devices newly established in their region, and impersonal information 
tools to create contact with financing actors.  
Consequently, local support actors and tools catalyzed the emergence of new venture projects 
and helped entrepreneurs combine various resources to implement their projects. They 
enabled the encounter between entrepreneurs, on the one side, and multiple programs and 
actors, on the other side, which were heterogeneous in terms of supply content, intervention 
level (European, Federal, Regional-Länder, local), and status (public and private actors).  
 
5.3 The fragility of the local intermediation collective action initiated by BioRegio 
However, as shown by an analyis of the elements enabling the intermediation activity until 
2001, as well as by developments after 2001, this intermediation activity – which is key to 
understanding the surge in new venture creations – was only slightly enhanced by the cluster 
policy studied. 
 
5.3.1 The role of contextual elements  
BioRegio did foster the capacity of newly created support organizations to act as 
intermediaries between entrepreneurs and resource providers through, first, the 
aforementioned creation of inter-knowledge and division of labor among organizations based 
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in the regions supporting entrepreneurship and, second, through increased interactions 
between scientists and support organizations, which made the latter able to identify 
entrepreneurs in the early stages of their project needing resources and intermediation 
services. These increased interactions resulted mainly from the continuous organization of 
events – before and after BioRegio’s results were announced – where support organizations 
presented their service proposals. 
However, two contextual elements, independent from BioRegio, were important for this 
intermediation activity: the venture-capital context and the biotech industry life-cycle stage 
(therefore, the entrepreneurs’ profiles). First, funding was greatly available at the time when 
BioRegio took place, in the form of venture-capital. Biotech firms are highly capital-intensive 
because implementing an R&D project up to the stage where an innovative product (e.g. a 
new active compound, drug, diagnostics system or research tool) can be commercialized takes 
several years and often requires millions of dollars. In Germany, the number of venture-
capital firms investing in biotechnology surged from two at the beginning of the 1990’s to 
over 15 by early 1999 (Mietsch, 1999) and 20 venture-capital firms initiating activity in 
biotechnology between 1995 and 2000 could be identified in this research. The amounts 
invested in life sciences ventures kept increasing in the late 1990’s (see figure 2). This new 
type of funding was so widespread that many investors were actively seeking projects to 
invest in. 
“In 1998, anyone wanting money for his company could get some. There was so much 
money everywhere… Venture-capitalists didn’t really pay attention to what you said to 
them. Someone from [a Berlin-based venture-capital firm] came to see us and he only 
asked three questions (…). In two months, we had the money.” (biotech firm 3, 
founder/CEO)  
 
The great availability of financial support mainly resulted from elements disconnected from 
BioRegio, namely: (i) the drastic increase of high technology stock markets (Nasdaq, Neuer 
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Market) in that period and (ii) the incentive-laden public program (“BTU”) noted that 
promoted venture-capital. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The second contextual element was that the biotechnology industry was new in Germany 
when BioRegio was launched. Therefore, most entrepreneurs were scientists with no prior 
experience in firm creation or management12 and deprived of significant relevant social 
capital, increased the need for this intermediation activity. The research revealed that this type 
of entrepreneur overwhelmingly used existing support actors and tools to gain access to 
needed resources, as opposed to more experienced entrepreneurs who mostly relied on their 
interpersonal networks. 
 
The developments taking place after 2001 confirm the role of these two contextual elements 
and demonstrate the fragility of the intermediation activity described. 
 
5.3.2 The weakening of a local intermediation collective action after 2001 
From 2001 as the BioRegio program officially came to an end, the supply in funding 
resources for entrepreneurs sharply decreased. The Federal Ministry of Economy, assessing 
that the venture-capital market had become mature, lowered its support to venture-capital at 
the same time. For example in January 2003, the Tbg stopped offering a risk-covering system 
for equity investors with its silent partnerships and increased its interest rates. More 
importantly, high tech stock markets crashed at the end of 2000, initiating a plunge that lasted 
                                                 
12
 In my sample, a large proportion of the entrepreneurs were young scientists. Non-tenured academic 
researchers amounted to 40% of the overall founders between 1996 and 2000 (35 out of 88) and were engaged in 
58% of venture creations (14 out of 24).  
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for several years13. Combined with the public scaling back, this financial crisis resulted in a 
severe contraction in venture-capital for entrepreneurs.  
“My problem is to make money! You start working, you make ten investments ... then, 
you can’t sell any of them, half of them go bankrupt. After that kind of experiences, 
you’d rather not invest again if the project you are evaluating is not 100% sure. In 
2002, we didn’t make any new investment in biotech (...). As long as IPOs are 
impossible, we don’t want to extend our portfolio.” (venture-capital firm, Berlin, 
January 2003) 
 
The overall biotechnology investments made by venture-capital companies in Germany 
declined from 565 million euros in 2000 to 216 million euros by 2003. Thus, according to a 
survey on German biotechnology firms in 2004, the general need for capital amounted to 
more than 600 million euros (Ernst & Young, 2005). 
In addition to this drastic decrease in venture-capital, the entrepreneur’s profile also evolved. 
Because of the reduced attractiveness of start-up creations for young scientists in this difficult 
funding context and the maturing of the industry (existing biotechnology firms increasingly 
“generated” individuals with technological projects who wanted to create their own 
company), many firm founders after 2001 possessed more relevant social capital and some 
prior experience in firm creation/management. A small majority of them (12 out of the 21 
founders of biotech firms between 2001 and 2003 studied) had been employed in a 
biotechnology or life science research company before creating their own business.  
 
In this new context, local support actors and tools were significantly weakened. Still acting as 
intermediaries but in a reduced manner, they contributed only slightly to a few new venture 
creations, and were largely unable to sustain the development of existing ones. In firms 
created both after and before 2001, the entrepreneurs who managed to obtain funding (from 
venture capitalists or pharmaceutical companies) after 2001 did not use local public support 
                                                 
13
 Between September 2000 and March 2001, the value of biotechnology firms’ stocks on Neuer Markt was 
more than halved. The decrease lasted until 2004 (Ernst & Young, 2004).  
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actors but preexisting interpersonal relations (between their initial investor and other 
investors, or between themselves and client firms). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here  
------------------------------- 
 
6 Discussion 
As a result of the empirical results, the following theoretical proposition can now be made. 
A cluster policy can enhance the creation of new ventures through a three-step mechanism: 
1. creating a convergence of individual interests, which will enable a collective action 
aiming at sustaining entrepreneurship in territories; 
2. bringing regional actors to formalize their initial cooperation through a process of 
organizational creation / stabilization ; 
3. reinforcing the capacity of these newly created institutions to act as intermediaries 
between entrepreneurs and both territory-based and non territory-based institutions 
(variable in each region), through (i) the creation of inter-knowledge and division of 
labor among local organizations supporting entrepreneurship, (ii) increased 
interactions between potential entrepreneurs and support organizations. 
Because the particular design of the cluster policy studied made it possible, it can be argued 
that this three-step social mechanism is enabled by a specific role of the Federal state – as 
designer of the policy. First, the Federal state sets general objectives which are consistent with 
other research and innovation or local development policies being implemented at the same 
time. Second, its criteria for selecting model regions govern “at a distance” the genesis of 
cluster organization projects. They bring local actors to list their regional capacities (regarding 
entrepreneurship support and research), therefore their specific problems and lacking 
resources, to conceive adhoc solutions and to combine in these proposed solutions already 
existing programs and tools at the federal, state and municipal levels. Third, apart from these 
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explicit demands, the Federal state leaves considerable freedom to local actors in the 
conceiving of their local project and in its implementation, which enhances creativity at the 
territory-level. 
 
These results make it possible to strengthen the literature on cluster policies and clusters on 
the specific issue of entrepreneurship. Four main contributions are suggested. 
First, the research presented here deconstructs the notion of (regional) institutions that lies at 
the core of regional innovation systems and institutionalist approaches by providing this 
concept with a rich empirical content and by reintroducing the actors’ perspective. Based on a 
nuanced analytical description of the regional actors at the centre of interactions generating an 
entrepreneurial dynamic, this paper shows, contrary to the claims often made in these 
theoretical perspectives, that key regional institutions cannot be considered as a given or 
naturally inherent to regions. Their genesis is a “problem” worth being studied and, as 
evidenced by the analysis of the collective action induced by BioRegio, most of the key 
regional institutions are socially constructed. Their identity – because of its high territory-
specificity – has to be specified, as well as the rationale for their actions. Several types of 
regional institutions are instrumental in enhancing entrepreneurship. Four types shall be 
distinguised: (i) initiators of a regional collective action, (ii) new region-specific institutions 
created as a result of the cluster policy’s implementation and acting as intermediaries together 
with other local organizations supporting entrepreneurs, (iii) stabilizers of these new 
institutions (local firms in Heidelberg, state governments and an industry association in 
Berlin-Brandenburg), (iv) local resource providers (Heidelberg Innovation, BioRegio 
association in Heidelberg, state ministries of economy and research, local venture-capital-
firms in Berlin-Brandenburg)14. These institutions are interdependent: their action at a time t 
                                                 
14
 As stated in the results section, many resource-providers for entrepreneurs are also located outside of their 
territory (e.g. Tbg, Federal ministries of research and economy).  
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is made possible by the actions of the others at time t-1 or t+1. The data showed that these 
institutions are highly contingent on regional resources and dynamics. 
 
One conclusion can be drawn from this analysis. As opposed to institutional analyses in 
which institutions appear very stable (e.g. Casper, 2000) and to regional innovation systems 
specialists who view the regional level as the appropriate one for enhancing innovation 
processes, this study highlights the fragility of institutions playing a key role in regional 
entrepreneurship and demonstrates the limitations of such a territory-based collective action 
aimed at supporting new venture creations. These institutions survive due to the repeated 
behaviors of actors who work in them: they stay vibrant because these actors engage in 
various actions to gain support from other institutions (regional governments, industrial 
firms), to play an efficient intermediation role between entrepreneurs and other institutions 
(mainly venture-capital firms) and to manage to cooperate with newly created support 
institutions. As a factor that has been often overlooked in previous contributions dedicated to 
cluster policies to explain the region-specificity of institutions that are key for innovation 
processes (Braczyk et al., 1998; Cooke et al., 1997), territories are unequal in their capacity to 
build solutions for the problems that they face. Limitations in regional resources and support 
(e.g. the inability to build a venture-capital fund in Berlin-Brandenburg, due to a moderate 
involvement of local banks and the presence of a single large pharmaceutical company) 
constitute a constraint for the action of regional institutions created to support 
entrepreneurship. Finally, as evidenced by the post 2001 difficulties, they are strongly 
dependent upon their institutional environments (e.g. other national policies, availability of 
venture-capital, entrepreneurs’ individual experience).  
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The second contribution to the literature on cluster policies refers to the problematic notion of 
trust as an explanatory factor for cooperation and communication among regional actors 
within clusters. For regional innovation systems specialists, a cooperative culture and a high 
level of interaction, based in trust among regional actors, are core elements of a functioning 
innovative cluster (Cooke et al., 1997; Cooke, 2001). The concept of trust is problematic in 
that it is often used as an explanatory factor without actually being explained, making the 
claim sometimes tautological: actors are said to cooperate because they trust each other, and 
since they cooperate, to trust each other, but the elements founding this trust remain 
unexplained. The successive waves of collective cooperation at the territory level which were 
depicted in the cases studied could be explained by shared or convergent interests among 
regional actors and actors’ instrumental rationality (the desire to solve identified problems 
with conceived solutions) without having to draw on the notion of trust. A first moment of 
cooperation and communication between territory-based actors occurred in 1995-1996, and 
enabled converging interests of individual actors. This was because local institutions were 
“ready” from a cognitive and an organizational perspective to engage in such a cluster policy. 
This collective cooperation persisted, even when financial support from the Federal ministry 
was not provided as in the ‘losing’ region case, because the collective plans conceived in the 
application phase were implemented in both losing and winning regions. This undifferentiated 
implementation of plans, which was observed – but unexplained – in later public contests 
(Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005)15, was explained in an instrumental rationality perspective by 
the emergence of problem solving opportunities for some regional actors. Finally, these initial 
waves of collective action were stabilized in organizations and tools supporting entrepreneurs, 
giving rise to another kind of collective action: an intermediation activity between the 
                                                 
15
 40% of the regions that lost the InnoRegio program – which aimed at strengthening the economic 
competitiveness and innovation capability in the eastern part of Germany by fostering regional innovation 
networks - still implemented their knowledge production concepts. In case of the Exist program, 79% of refused 
projects were nevertheless implemented (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). 
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entrepreneurs and their resource-providers. That is, a division of the entrepreneurs’ support 
labor in which, more than trust, a formalization activity was required, made the cooperation 
between various organizations and tools sustainable. These empirical results invite scholars 
not to resort too quickly to the notion of trust to explain cooperation and communication 
within clusters, as the concept of instrumental and normative rationality may prove just as 
sufficient. 
 
Third, this research provides a better understanding of the causal relationships between the 
increase in interactions among regional actors induced by some cluster policies and new 
venture creations, which have been previously stated but not explained (Eickelpasch and 
Fritsch, 2005). The causal link is indirect: the increased interactions and cooperation in the 
BioRegio application phase did not directly lead to new venture creations. They did so 
indirectly through a stabilization of the initial cooperation in the form of new tools and 
organizations acting as intermediaries. This result invites us to think that, in addition to 
informal cooperations that lie at the core of the regional innovation systems literature, 
formalized cooperations (resulting from informal ones) play a key role in supporting regional 
entrepreneurial dynamics 
 
The fourth major contribution of the paper is to expand multi-level governance explanations 
that underline the existence of several levels of action (national, regional, and municipal) 
involved in cluster policies (e.g. Sternberg et al., 2010). The cases studied empirically 
validates the hypothesis that cluster policies are “helpful by integrating previously separate 
fields of policy” (Sternberg et al., 2010, p. 1071) and provides insights into the modalities of 
this integration. In fact, these policies are helpful in that they create coordination, at a 
political-administrative level, between existing public programs. I show how previous or 
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parallel municipal, regional and state policies for various purposes were combined by support 
actors in each territory after the launching of BioRegio. Cluster policies are also helpful for 
entrepreneurs in that they create coherence between public policies existing at various levels, 
therefore providing visibility and facilitating easier access to resources. 
 
7 Conclusion 
The analysis of the dynamic induced over 10 years by a cluster policy offers new insights into 
the role and nature of key regional institutions for new venture creations. Because of the 
exploratory nature of the results and the usual limitations regarding generalization, future 
research could investigate in a more systematic and comparative perspective, the effects of 
cluster policies on high-tech new venture creation and development across multiple countries. 
In particular, this research invites researchers to empirically study the effects of such policies 
on the performance of these new ventures, including their innovation ability, economic 
profitability, survival and development rates. Empirical results on these issues would provide 
further light on the doubts raised by several scholars on the capacity of public action, as 
opposed to market mechanisms, to create economically efficient and innovative clusters 
(Cooke, 2001; Dohse, 2007).  
The study has several implications for public policies promoting high-tech entrepreneurship. 
First, at least some policies should pursue the objective of having territorial interconnected 
tools and organizations which support entrepreneurs, especially in the early stages of an 
industry when entrepreneurs are inexperienced. Second, this paper raises important questions 
concerning the time frame usually chosen by politicians or public administrations to 
specifically promote biotechnology advances and their commercialization. A five-year budget 
horizon seems too short to enhance entrepreneurial initiatives to permit newly created firms to 
sufficiently develop technologies that can be commercialized. Third, the paper shows that the 
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sense of “right moment” can be crucial for the success of any public policy endeavour. 
BioRegio echoed other national, regional and municipal policies launched in the same period 
as well as a growing interest by the financial community in biotechnology. Thus, the program 
results can also be explained by its timing.  
Fourth, the current study questions the efficacy of such a cluster policy. By drastically 
enhancing the number of new venture creations by inexperienced entrepreneurs-scientists and 
by amplifying the effects of the high-tech financial bubble of the late 1990’s, BioRegio 
favored the creation of small and fragile start-ups, with sometimes unclear market 
perspectives and, therefore, risky chances of survival and profitability. A more selective 
policy targeted at sustaining the most promising ventures and entrepreneurs, without the 
‘artificial’ geographical limits imposed by such cluster policies, could have been more 
relevant for enhancing entrepreneurship in a sustainable way. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of number of biotech firms in Germany (1995-2004) 
Source: Ernst & Young, 2002, 2004, 2005. 
 
 
Figure 2: Biotechnology investments made by VC companies based in Germany (1996 – 2001) 
 
Sources : European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA); Center for European 
Research in Economics (ZEW). 
 
 
Table 1: Decision process to participate in BioRegio 
 
Region Time Initiator Reason for wanting to participate 
Rhine-Neckar 
Triangle 
Immediately 
after 
October 
1995 
Dean of Heidelberg University: 
invited most potentially 
concerned institutions (research 
institutions, pharmaceutical and 
chemical firms) to meet for an 
initial collective reflection 
Strategic and normative reasons: a 
will to differentiate Heidelberg 
university from competitors through 
an engagement in life sciences, a 
desire to create new professional 
opportunities for students and to 
gain additional revenues through 
cooperations with firms, and a belief 
in the university’s mission of 
commercializing academic 
knowledge 
Berlin-
Brandenbrug 
In the 
months 
prior to 
October 
1995 
Political-administrative actors, 
mainly (i) cabinet director 
[Staatssekretär] in charge of 
urban development and 
technology of the Berlin state 
State ministry had already identified 
the biotechnology sector as a key 
industry to be supported for local 
economic development purposes, 
both actors saw BioRegio as an 
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ministry of economy, (ii) an 
organization (“TSB”) created and 
supported by this state ministry 
with the mission to identify key 
technological areas for Berlin and 
to promote academia-industry 
cooperation 
opportunity to implement this 
strategy 
 
 
Table 2: Local actors’ reasons for wanting to participate in BioRegio  
 
Local actors Reasons 
Directors of research institutes Viewed BioRegio as an opportunity to make 
researchers more aware of the need for applied 
science and economic transformation of academic 
results, to create more scientific jobs, and to 
obtain external funding 
Biotech firms Expected the public contest would generate a 
number of R&D grants and an improvement of 
their environments including greater public 
acceptance and more liberal regulations 
Representatives from local public authorities Hoped to promote economic growth in their 
territories or regions 
Pharmaceutical firms  Mainly motivated by a desire to sustain their 
territory’s general economic dynamics 
 
 
Table 3: Three types of tools and organizations supporting entrepreneurs in the late 
1990’s 
 
Type Purpose Example 
Technology transfer 
offices (“TTOs”) 
To foster the licensing 
of patents and venture 
creations by scientists 
In Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg, German 
Cancer Research Center and European Molecular 
Biology Laboratory TTOs 
Specialized 
“technology parks” 
To promote national 
technological 
innovation (for fed. 
govt); to seek new 
financial resources 
(for universities)16 
In Berlin-Brandenburg: Biotechnology Center in 
Henningsdorf (public initiative); Biotech Park 
Charlottenburg (private initiative) 
 
Other systems 
sustaining 
technological 
innovation and new 
firm creations 
To foster a region’s 
economic 
development and 
technological 
competitiveness 
(i) direct financial subsidies for R&D projects 
undertaken by firms or for young innovative 
companies (e.g. Land Venture-Capital Funds 
and the Bade-Württemberg Venture Capital 
Funds) ; 
(ii) free counseling (“coaching”) services offered 
to entrepreneurs ; 
(iii)  business plan contests ; 
(iv)  Land-specific tools designed to help scientists 
create their companies (e.g. “Junge 
Innovatoren” launched in Baden-Württemberg 
in 1995)  
                                                 
16
 Source : (Krücken, 1999, 2003) 
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Table 4:  Main contact-making by support organizations between entrepreneurs and 
funding actors 
 
Region Main contacts made with funding actors 
Rhine-Neckar - “Heidelberg Innovation” seed funds + Federal “Tbg” (co-financing 
with VC) 
- BioRegio Association (R&D grant) 
Berlin-Brandenbrug - Regional states, Federal ministries of research and economy, 
European Union (direct subsidies) 
- Local VC firms 
- “Tbg”  
 
 
Table 5: Findings describing the dynamic initiated by BioRegio in two regions 
 
 Rhine-Neckar Triangle Berlin-Brandenburg 
1995- 1996 Genesis of a territory-based collective action to support entrepreneurs 
Involvement of public and private actors in territories: 
- Inventory of regional capabilities in biotechnology 
- Conceiving of a local project (existing and new organizations & tools): 
- BioRegio Association  
- Seed Funds & managing company 
(“Heidelberg Innovation”) (funded 
by BASF, Roche Diagnostics, Knoll, 
Merck & local banks, saving banks, 
insurance companies) 
- BioTop (supported by regional 
states Berlin and Brandenburg) 
- Tools by technology parks 
(Biostart,…) 
 
Nov. 1996-
2001 
Formalization of the initial cooperation by an organizational creation/stabilization 
- Genesis of new local support organizations and tools (Nov. 1996-1997) 
- Stabilization of BioRegio-derived organizations (1998-2001) : 
Support organizations created with BioRegio becoming viable: 
- funding from Federal research ministry, 
region-based industry & banks  
- funding from other institutions (e.g. 
regional states Berlin and Brandenburg, 
industry union) 
Context: Emergence of new support tools & organizations for entrepreneurs in the frame 
of regional and municipal policies  
Intermediation role of local support actors and tools between entrepreneurs & their 
partners: 
- norm diffusion 
- counseling 
- contact-making with (i) scientific partners, (ii) other support actors, 
(iii) funding actors  
Local support organizations and tools catalyzed entrepreneurial projects & enabled the 
encounter between entrepreneurs and multiple programs/actors 
After 2001 Weakening of a local intermediation collective action 
Decrease of funding supply for entrepreneurs 
& 
More experienced entrepreneurs with richer social capital  
Limited capacity of action for local support organizations and tools 
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Table 6 : Interviews carried out by actors’ categories 
 
 No. of organizations Rhine-Neckar 
Triangle 
Berlin-
Brandenb
urg 
Other No. of 
intervie
ws  
Biotech firms (founders 
and CEOs) 
42 21 20 1 67 
Pharmaceutical firms 6 
 
2 3 1 7 
State & Federal ministries 5  - 3 2 10 
Local public support 
actors* 
16 
 
6 7 3 34 
Universities/ research 
centers**  
3 1 2 - 3 
Financing institutions 24 
(includ. VC firms and 
Tbg/KfW: 22) 
1 
1 
10 
8 
13 
13 
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Consultants / auditors 8 1 1 6 8 
      
TOTAL 103 34 45 24 161 *** 
 
* Biotechnology promotion associations, local seed funds, technology parks, technology transfer offices. 
** other than technology transfer offices. 
*** The difference between this figure and the total number of interviews that were actually carried out (n = 
157) results from the fact that some interviews were conducted with individuals who belonged to two 
organizations in the study. However, the number of such individuals was small.  
 
The questions asked during the interviews aimed at reconstructing the historical local and national 
dynamics that took place in Germany especially in the booming phase of the biotechnology industry 
(from the mid 1990’s on). The questions asked to entrepreneurs were also intended to illuminate, 
chronologically, how they created and developed their ventures. 
 
 
Table 7: Biotechnology firm cases studied 
 
Creation date 1980-1995 1996-1998 1999-2000 2001-2003 Total 
In-depth longitudinal studies 
Rhine-Neckar Triangle 
Berlin-Brandenburg 
7 
5 
2 
4 
2 
2 
8 
4 
4 
3 
1 
2 
22 
12 
10 
Total cases 
Rhine-Neckar Triangle 
Berlin-Brandenburg 
10 
6 
4 
8 
5 
3 
17 
7 
10 
6 
3 
3 
41 
21 
20 
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